The Noble Discipline of IR:
The Stubborn Myths of 1648 and 1919,
and the Denial of Imperialism

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Panel Session 2.3: “IR’s Disciplinary Dialogue”
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*History is more or less bunk. It's tradition. We don't want tradition. We want to live in the present, and the only history that is worth a tinker's damn is the history that we make today.*
— Henry Ford, 1916

*Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.*
— George Santayana, 1905

The discipline of International Relations has come a long way with regards to dialogue. A mere 25 years ago, the so-called inter-paradigm debates were at heart a way of avoiding dialogue, and until the mid-1990’s, disciplinary mechanisms practically precluded dialogue between the different theoretical tribes on the inside of established academe and anyone branded as an outsider. Although there could probably still profitably be more dialogue, roundtables joining representatives of radically different theoretical approaches are now relatively common at the major conferences, and in both meta-theoretical and theoretical endeavours, we find attempts at dialogue with the purpose either of establishing a common ground or at least being clear on what the different scholars disagree on.¹

In this article we will argue that there nevertheless is one crucial dimension of the discipline where dialogue has been virtually non-existent, to the detriment of the discipline and its very ability to make sense of the subject matter that it purports to study. This dimension is the historical one. Over the last 20 years, both the history of the discipline International Relations and the subject matter international relations has undergone major revisions.² Nevertheless, the broader discipline has largely ignored these revised insights, and the myths of yesteryear are perpetuated in textbooks and curricula for future generations to learn. In a way, this state

¹ Ref Checkel etc. on bridge-building. Wight and Jackson on meta-stuff. The Wendt-symposium in RIS.
² Ref historical and historiographical turn.
of affairs is to be expected. International Relations is a presentist discipline, like Henry Ford concerned with the problems of the here and now. A nod is often given to Santayana, particularly from self-ascribed realists, but “the past” that is remembered, often tells us more about the academic that remembers than about the alleged past.

Two myths are particularly pervasive, and particularly detrimental; the foundational myths of the discipline and its subject matter. We call them respectively the myth of 1919 and the myth of 1648. The latter provides a foundational myth about the states, the state system and its underlying principles and institutions, while the former provides a foundational myth about the discipline, with a focus on the close relationship between the subject matter under study and the discipline that studies it. The myth of 1648 is detrimental because it provides a distorted view of how the modern state and state-system came into being, and thus of the naturalness and quality of the basic units in much International Relations research; it provides a statist ontology ill equipped to handle the challenges of global governance, suzerainty and empire. The myth of 1919 is detrimental because it presents the discipline as solely a reflection of current developments in international relations, and because it allows for a reading of the historiography of the discipline where certain theoretical perspectives win out due to them being ones that best explain “the real world”; it provides an empiricist epistemology ill equipped to handle the many-faceted and constantly changing challenges that faces the discipline today. In brief, they are myths of what we study and how we study it, and it matters a lot that the discipline gets them twisted. For, if these two myths have one thing in common, it is the fact that they systematically underplay the role played by non-state empires (especially empires), and the imperialism of European states beyond Europe. IR is constructed as a discipline dealing with states in a world where states are the sole actors.

We proceed in three parts. First, we deal with the myth of 1648 and 1919 respectively. With a nod to Henry Ford, we open each of these sections with a brief note on the original story – what passed as common wisdom 25 years ago. We then provide an overview of the how these myths have been dismantled recently, before addressing how the myths nevertheless still live on. We do this through a detailed reading of central textbooks for International Relations

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3 A special branch of the discipline has even concerned itself specifically with the “lessons of history”. See e.g. <> A poignant critique, calling instead for “the history of lessons”, can be found in Rasmussen <>.

4 We are in no way implying that we “get it right”, as this would presuppose a mind-world duality which we do not subscribe to (cf. Jackson 2010). We are on the other hand trying to open up thinking-space where the traditional myths close it down, and are concerned with the myths as historical products.
students. Through this last part, we show that these insights are completely ignored, and how even the traditional accounts in some cases are distorted beyond recognition. The third and final section then deals in more detail with the question of why International Relations has been so reluctant to enter into dialogue with its own history, and the consequences of a continued reliance on remembering past bunkum.

1. The Myth of 1648

The ontology of IR starts with Westphalia. For IR orthodoxy has conventionally (and conveniently) dated the ontological emergence of the state, the states system, the principle of sovereignty, and the end of the suzerain order of the respublica Christiana to the end of the Thirty Years’ War and the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648. Westphalia has figured centrally in the IR literature as the point of origin of the modern state, a novel concept of sovereignty, and the European state-system.

But this account has recently been subject to a number of convincing historical and historiographical revisions, relegating the traditional story of the emergence of the statist ontology of IR to the category of myth. Authors such as Benno Teschke, Stephen Krasner and Andreas Osiander figure prominently among these “myth busters”, and their attempts have been published in prominent IR journals and by established university presses. The key features of these revisionist accounts is that argument is that neither the modern state – nor for

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5 The Peace of Westphalia consisted of two relatively similar treaties, the Treaty of Münster (*Instrumentum Pacis Monasteriensis* or IPM) and the Treaty of Osnabrück (*Instrumentum Pacis Osnabrugensis* or IPO). Sweden participated in the negotiations in Osnabrück and guaranteed the treaty, while a French delegation was present in Münster and guaranteed that the treaty was to be followed. The Holy Roman Emperor and a number of political units of the Empire were parties to the treaties. There are a number of translations and editions of the treaties, many of them available online. The most authoritative editions, however, can be found on the website *Acta Pacis Westphalicae* (‘Document edition of the Peace of Westphalia’) [www.pax-westphalica.de]. This online project carries both treaties in their original language (Latin) and a number of translations, while other editions generally carry only the English translation of the Treaty of Münster.

that matter the state system – originated in 1648, and that sovereignty was certainly not enacted in the Treaties of Westphalia. Following these accounts, IR ought by now to depart from the perennial Westphalian account of its origins.

The “Westphalian turn” is so dominant in the discipline, that one need not look far to find examples of it, and most IR scholars will be familiar with the traditional story. A few quotes will remind the reader of the well-established position of 1648. Hans Morgenthau, for instance, writes in *Politics Among Nations* that various ‘rules of international law were securely established in 1648, when the Treaty of Westphalia brought the religious wars to an end and made the territorial state the cornerstone of the modern states system.’ The same view can be found in Leo Gross, who refers to the Peace of Westphalia as ‘the end of an epoch and the opening of another’; likewise Adam Watson wrote that “The Westphalian Settlement legitimized a commonwealth of sovereign states.” David Held argues that the Peace of Westphalia ‘entrenched, for the first time, the principle of territorial sovereignty in inter-state affairs.’ Throughout the IR canon, these references have abounded.

### 1.1 Westphalia: Myth and Deconstruction

The traditional understanding of the Peace of Westphalia in IR is at best a myth, as the texts of the treaties signed in Münster (IPM) and Osnabrück (IPO) on 24 October 1648 – which together constitute what is normally referred to as the Peace of Westphalia – tell a story quite different to the conventional one.

**The First Story; or Why the State System did not Emerge in 1648**

The traditional story will have it that Westphalia marked the constitution of the state system. But far from inaugurating the modern state-system, the Westphalian settlement was a momentary retreat from an already established idea of a modern system of states and the recapitulation of an earlier and more feudal and medieval order. Indeed, the idea that rulers had final authority over their territory – which followed more from the Reformations than any other event, and which had been so clearly enunciated in the Preamble to the English Statute

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of Appeals (1534), and by the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 – was actually limited by the treaties of 1648. Thus, the international system of states neither originated from Westphalia, nor was it formalized there. The world after 1648 was largely the same as it had been before.\footnote{A plausible argument is that the Peace of Westphalia was the beginning of a long tradition of peace conferences. However, few scholars advance this point, and there is clear evidence that this was not the case either, as this tradition was already well established between European great powers long before 1648. See Randall Lesaffer, ‘The Westphalian Peace Treaties and the Development of the Tradition of Great European Peace Settlements Prior to 1648,’ Grotiana 18 (1997); Randall Lesaffer, ‘The Medieval Canon Law of Contract and Early Modern Treaty Law,’ Journal of the History of International Law 2, no. 2 (2000) and Randall Lesaffer, ‘Peace Treaties from Lodi to Westphalia,’ in Peace Treaties and International Law in European History, ed. Randall Lesaffer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).}

The Second Story; or Why Empires Existed both Before and Long After 1648

If the novelty of sovereignty is to the fore in claims that the Westphalian settlement marked a turning point, a second and supporting claim is that 1648 witnessed the defeat of the Holy Roman Emperor’s universal aspirations. The orthodoxy in IR has generally presented the Thirty Years’ War as a war between two main parties: on the one side the representatives of an imperial or universalistic order, mainly the Holy Roman Emperor and the Spanish king – both loyal to the Pope; and on the other side the representatives of a more particularistic and anti-hegemonic order advancing the modern idea of state sovereignty, mainly France, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands.\footnote{See for instance Torbjørn Knutsen, A History of International Relations Theory (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 85; David Boucher, Political Theories of International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 290; or even Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 32}

Revisionist accounts of the Thirty Years’ War have questioned whether the war was at all about containing the universalistic ambitions of the Habsburgs. Firstly, the Emperor was already weakened when the war broke out in 1618, and the Empire itself was already divided politically and militarily between a Catholic alliance, the League, and an anti-Catholic alliance, the Union. In the early stages of the war, the potential consequences of Habsburg collapse were more feared in Europe than their hegemonic ambitions.\footnote{Andreas Osiander, ‘Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,’ International Organization 55, no. 2 (2001), p. 253-254.} Secondly, the interventions of Denmark, Sweden, and France were motivated more their desire to take advantage of the weak position of the Habsburgs than by a fear of their hegemonic aspirations.\footnote{Ibid., p. 255-258.} What kept the war going was not that the Habsburgs represented a threat or that they had universal aspirations. As Osiander concludes, “The war was not fought because the
Habsburgs were straining to expand their role, but because other actors were seeking to diminish it.\footnote{Ibid.}

\textbf{The Third Story; Or Why Westphalia was no UN Charter}

After disposing of the supposed innovation of sovereignty and the defeat of rampant universalism, the question which remains, then, is whether 1648 nevertheless represented the foundation of the states-system: a new international order based upon state sovereignty. It is unclear quite what the basis of such an understanding can be, as the Peaces of Westphalia were a step back from an already established idea of state sovereignty, as understood by decades of political practice, political theory, and even the internal order of the Empire as sanctioned by the Peace of Augsburg a century earlier, in 1555. For the Peace Treaties of Westphalia make no mention of sovereignty or \textit{cuius regio, eius religio}. Quite the contrary. Where the Treaty of Augsburg gave the polities of the Empire the right to choose their own confession, this right was \textit{taken away} in 1648. By the Treaties of Westphalia, the religious situation in the Empire was to return to the \textit{status quo ante}, to a date arbitrarily set to 1 January 1624. Religion was \textit{no longer} something over which rulers within the Empire could decide upon.\footnote{Art. V, 2 IPO and § 47 IPM. While the Peace of Westphalia confirmed the Treaty of Augsburg, this was nevertheless done with a few reservations, as it stated that the Peace of Augsburg was \textit{not} to be valid with respect to ‘certain Articles in the said Transaction [Augsburg] which are troublesom and litigious.’ See Art. V,1 IPO and § 47 IPM.} As Krasner has concluded, with respect to religion ‘Westphalia was less consistent with modern notions of sovereignty than Augsburg, which had been concluded almost a century earlier.’\footnote{Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Westphalia and All That,’ in \textit{Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change}, ed. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 244.} Augsburg and the proto-sovereignty accorded to the polities of the Empire had created a dynamic imbalance within the Empire, to which was ascribed much of the blame for the wars of religion within the Empire generally, and for the Thirty Years’ War more specifically. The solution which the negotiators came to in 1648 was thus to limit and constrain that principle.\footnote{Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Westphalia and All That,’ in \textit{Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change}, ed. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 242 (emphasis added); see also Art. VII,1 IPO and § 47 IPM.}

Furthermore, Augsburg was not a European-wide treaty wither. The principle of \textit{cuius regio, eius religio} was a principle which in 1555 was valid only for the \textit{internal} affairs of the
The Treaty of Augsburg, just as Westphalia, has also been misread by early-twentieth century founders of IR as applying to Europe as a whole, not just the Empire.

The Unattractive and Messy True Story of Westphalia

The Treaties of Westphalia do not tell a clear-cut, neat, story of transformation. Rather, they are better understood within a story of advances, setbacks, and messy entanglements of feudal suzerainty with some rare elements of what we now call modern state sovereignty. Illustrative of how the feudal (as opposed to sovereign) character of Westphalia, both France and Sweden were given fiefdom over several territories formerly under imperial jurisdiction. The Osnabrück Treaty, illustrates this well, as the regents of Sweden are proclaimed “Dukes of Bremen, Werden, and Pomerania, and as Princes of Rugen, or Lords of Wismar” – in clear contradistinction with what entails from the modern principle of sovereignty – as made vassals of the emperor:

The most Serene Queen, the future Kings, and the Crown of Sweden, shall reciprocally acknowledge, that they hold all and every the foresaid Fiefs of his Imperial Majesty and the Empire; and upon that score shall demand, as often as shall be requisite, the Renewal of the Investitures, taking the Oath of Fidelity, and all that is thereto annex’d, like the former Possessors, and like Vassals of the Empire.

Accordingly, neither is it plausible to argue that the settlement of Westphalia was a general system-wide formalization of the principle of state sovereignty as a foundation of the European system of states.

Neither was the right of states to have their own foreign policy and join alliances a Westphalian innovation. While it is correct that the treaties granted the polities of the Empire this right, this right was not something new. The right to form or join alliances with foreign

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19 The principle of *cuius rei, eius religio* from 1555 was not consistent with sovereignty either, for that matter: The Reformed Confession, Calvinism, was not recognized at Augsburg. According to article XVII of the Treaty: “However, all such as do not belong to the two above named religions [the Augsburg Confession and the old religion] shall not be included in the present peace but be totally excluded from it.”
20 Art. X, 12 IPO (emphasis added).
21 Art. X, 15 IPO.
22 Art. VIII, 2 IPO and § 63 IPM (emphasis added).
powers was a right the polities of the Empire had possessed before, but which they had lost during the Thirty Years’ War, through the 1635 Peace of Prague.  

State, sovereignty, and the international system did not originate in the Treaties of Westphalia, and their emergence was the result of a long process of change rather than a clear-cut break with the feudal system of Christendom. As we have shown above, in spite of the many references to the Westphalian birth of the statist ontology of IR, scrutiny of the treaties themselves and revisionist scholarship published over the last two decades make a tight case for relegating that story to the world of fantasy, and doing away with the tales we tell about Westphalia. Given the weight of the arguments and the central place 1648 has been given in historical debates about the discipline, one could reasonably expect this to have trickled down to the central texts telling the story of the discipline – recent textbooks. Let us turn to the last generation of these textbooks which are used to educate the IR scholars of tomorrow. For even though most of them should have debunked the myth by now, we do not expect them to have forgotten about Westphalia altogether yet.

1.2 What Our Teachers Still Teach Us about Westphalia

Turning to the latest editions of the central textbooks in the discipline of IR, it is clear that the revisionist message about 1648 has been received by some. Textbooks are updated more and more often these days, and one would hope that the reason behind this was to take into account not only the latest developments in international politics, but also central debates about the discipline of IR. And true enough, some textbooks have taken the revisionist story into account and tell a story in which Westphalia no longer stands on a pedestal. Heather Rae, in a 2007 textbook writes that:

There is much debate over exactly when the process of early modern state formation started, with some scholars looking as far back as the eight or tenth century. Others cite the early fifteenth century, with the convening of the Council of Constance of

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1414-1418, treaties agreed upon at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, or the eighteenth century as the most significant dates in the development of the state.\textsuperscript{25} Another stellar example is a 2005 textbook: “What we would now recognize as the modern state system gradually evolved in Northern Europe between 1500 and 1688 and was consolidated by the rise of nationalism in Europe between 1800 and 1914.”\textsuperscript{26} The 2010 textbook by Keith L. Shimko provides the student with a nuanced understanding of the emergence of state and sovereignty.\textsuperscript{27}

The modern state system has been around (at least in the Western world) for about four hundred years. Some date the beginning of the modern state system to 1648, the year the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) ended with the Peace of Westphalia. Although 1648 is a convenient dividing point, the modern state system did not just appear overnight in that year: The world of 1647 did not look much different from the world of 1649. The emergence of the modern state was in reality a slow, gradual process driven by several important economic, religious, and military developments that eventually undermined the feudal order and replaced it with a new way of organizing European politics.\textsuperscript{28}

Alas, this is also where it ends. Four pages later, the student of IR can read that “What the treaty established was the modern notion of sovereignty – that rulers were not obligated to obey any higher, external authority.”\textsuperscript{29} Furthermore, the student of IR can learn that “[...] the modern sovereign state emerged from the maelstrom of the Thirty Years War and the Peace of Westphalia (1648)” and that “The idea of national sovereignty was codified in the peace of Westphalia (1648) as the only feasible solution to the religious conflict that gave rise to the bloody Thirty Years War (1618-1648).”\textsuperscript{30}


\textsuperscript{29} Ibid, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid. 217, 243.
Although acknowledging that neither states nor the international system was born overnight, Westphalia still figures as the central historical event in *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity* edited by Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press): “Between the end of the fifteenth and the mid-seventeenth centuries – the peace treaties of 1648 are a conventional date here, hence the ‘Westphalian order’ – a political arrangement based on the sovereign territorial state emerged in Europe.”

The same applies to all other IR textbooks. In spite of a full historical discussion of the Thirty Years’ War, *International Relations and World Politics: Security, Economy, Identity* by Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi write that “The peace agreement at Westphalia in 1648 helped solidify the trend of increasing power to the modern state at the expense of other political forms. [...] With the realignment of territorial borders, the notion of the sovereignty of the state also came to the fore.” Finally, we can read that “The prince or sovereign authority could even determine the religion of the inhabitants of a state.” This tension between an account sensitive to the historiography of international politics on the one hand – as accounted for by recent scholarship – and a reflex towards the mythical stories on the other is symptomatic of many of the textbooks. As such, in spite of giving a balanced historical account – emphasizing that “many scholars regard 1648 as marking the births of the modern national state and of the world political system based on sovereign states as primary political actors” (emphasis added) – the student of IR still learns from the 2007 *International Politics on the World Stage* that Westphalia marks a turning point heralding the “victory of the sovereign state” and the “decline of universalistic power.” Finally, adding a healthy dose of classical Realist ontology: “The Treaty of Westphalia (1648), more than any other event, demarcated the change between the old and new systems. With the sovereign state at its center, this newly evolving system is anarchical.”

The realist ontology is written onto 1648 in other recent textbooks as well – going even further. In another textbook from 2010, the student of IR can read that Westphalia “laid the foundation of the anarchic system of sovereign states that structural realists still emphasize

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33 Ibid. p. 70.
35 Ibid., p. 60.
today. Inherent in this new anarchic era were all the consequences – self-help, security dilemmas, was – that those realists might anticipate.\textsuperscript{36} The same book tells us that “the 1648 peace of Westphalia [...] marked the birth of the modern international system. [...] The dissolution of the empire cleared the way for the emergence of sovereign political unites within the old empire.”\textsuperscript{37} That the Holy Roman Empire was not dissolved until 1806 and coexisted with other European polities – be they states, empires, or other units – does not figure in the story the discipline tells its youngest disciples.

For the traditional story continues its life in textbooks, even more so in the ones more widely used.\textsuperscript{38} In spite of some passages suggesting to the reader that there may be an issue of contention about the meaning that should be accorded to 1648 (see notably pp. 46-47), we can still read in the book known to most IR students as “Baylis and Smith” that “The Westphalian Constitution of World Order: The Peace Treaties of Westphalia and Osnabruck (1648) established the legal basis of modern statehood and by implication the fundamental rules or constitution of modern world politics.” The book also exhibits a text box underlying what it sees as the key elements of this constitution: territoriality, sovereignty, autonomy. “In codifying and legitimating the principle of modern statehood the Westphalian Constitution gave birth to the modern states-system.”\textsuperscript{39} The treaty even allowed states to maintain armies, build fortifications, and levy taxes we are told.\textsuperscript{40}

Illustrative of the strong position the Westphalian myth still holds in IR, is the fact that it still appears as the central ordering device explaining the constitution of the international system. What is written about Westphalia is seldom referenced; 1648 is doxa. It just is.

To a discipline which has traditionally had a statist ontology, the ordering mechanism is Westphalia. Yet another textbook by Oxford University Press tells the students a story of pre-Westphalian chaos, relieved in 1648 by the advent of the state:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{37} Ibid. p. 44. See also pp. 9, 42.
  \item \textsuperscript{38} This is not only the case for textbooks in English. The Westphalian myth lives on beyond the Anglo-Saxon world. Parochial as we are, we can take one example of a Norwegian introductory text: “[...] the principle of sovereignty which was ratified at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 [...]”. Second edition of Anarki, Makt og Normer edited by Jon Hovi and Raino Malnes (Oslo: Abstrakt forlag, 2007), p. 32.
  \item \textsuperscript{40} Ibid., p. 282.
\end{itemize}
After many bloody battles, horrendous massacres, and sudden shifts in alliances, the Thirty Years’ War finally ended with the signing of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. This treaty established the important principle of sovereignty that remains the foundation of contemporary international politics. In an obvious blow to the Church, this meant that kings could decide domestic policy, such as the official religion within their domains, free from outside interference. The principle of sovereignty recognized in the peace of Westphalia represents an essential element in the creation of the modern nation-state.41

This view is also predominant in US textbooks. In spite of acknowledging that the treaties of Münster and Osnabrück did not enact the principle of sovereignty as we know it, Joseph Nye and David Welch seem to have mistaken the Treaty of Westphalia for that of Augsburg:

The Peace of Westphalia effectively entrenched the principle of _cuius regio, eius religio_, whereby each ruler would have the right to determine the religion of his or her own state. The treaties did not amount to a full endorsement of the principle of state sovereignty as we know it, as they contained rights of intervention to enforce their terms [...].42

To Nye and Welsh, the ontology of IR aster 1648 is nevertheless statist: “For most of the Westphalian era, sovereign states had only to worry about other sovereign states.”43 Again, Westphalia is what ordered international politics: “The Peace of Westphalia did not eliminate war from Europe, but it did moderate its severity and intensity.”44

It should be clear by now that IR textbooks do not – on the large – take recent historiography into account in what concerns 1648. It could be argued that more scholarship is required before IR textbooks should take a stance against the traditional tale of Westphalia. But what is striking to us, is the blatant disregard some textbooks show to recent scholarship, perpetuating instead the same old myths. Again without any references or guides to further reading. The 2008 edition of Karen Mingst’s much used textbook states that:

43 Ibid., p. 307.
44 Ibid., p. 73.
First, the Treaty of Westphalia embraced the notion of sovereignty. With one stroke, virtually all the small states in Europe attained sovereignty. The Holy Roman Empire was dead [...] With the pope and the emperor stripped of power, the notion of the territorial state was accepted. [...] The state with a national army emerged, its sovereignty acknowledged, and its secular base firmly established.  

Another US textbook also sees the state as emerging in 1648, arguing one place that “The Treaty of Westphalia established a new order of sovereign monarchs. From this point on, individual states – not the Holy Roman Empire – ruled Europe.” In other textbooks, references to the Westphalian tale abound: “the Peace of Westphalia gave birth to the modern nation-state system,” the Peace of Westphalia “gave rise to the territorially based, sovereign political units we now take for granted.” Again, this textbook seems to be of two minds. On the one hand, the student can read that “The nation-state was not born overnight, precisely at the moment the Peace of Westphalia was signed, but was the product of a gradual historical process” while on the other hand trumpeting that “Historical forces converged around Westphalia [...] It was, in a sense, the perfect storm. [...] Whether they realized it or not, the parties to the Treaty of Westphalia were not merely ending a war but were creating a revolutionary new system of sovereign states [...]”

Another textbook which at first hand seems to be fairly sensitive to historiographical debates is that of Joshua Goldstein and Jon Pevehouse: “The modern international system is often dated from the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which established the principles of independent sovereign states that continue to shape the international system today. The rules of state relations did not, however, originate at Westphalia; they took form in Europe in the 16th century.” This sensitivity, however, seems lost on the very next page: “The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia established the basic rules that have defined the international system ever since –

48 Ibid., p. 33.
49 Ibid., p. 36.
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states as equal and independent members of an international system.” And to finish off our round of IR textbooks and their sensitivity to historiographical research:

The Thirty Years War [...] was the bloodiest in history until World War II. By the time it was settled in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia, Europe’s monarchs had had enough of bashing each other and so constructed a balance-of-power system that endured until the French Revolution.

Our quick tour of widely used IR textbooks gives a clear verdict. The traditional tale of the ontological “big bang” of IR has not given way to recent historiographical scholarship.

2. The myth of 1919

What we have chosen to call the myth of 1919 is a less distinct myth than the myth of 1648, and to be precise, it covers not only events of 1919, but the alleged first decades of the discipline; it is a myth both of foundation and of development.

The myth of 1919 is as pervasive than the myth of 1648, probably because IR, like most disciplines, is more concerned about the subject matter of the discipline than about self-reflection. History has been seen as a useful quarry to mine for data-points and lessons for most of the social sciences that developed in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Historiographical reflection on the other hand usually only takes place when a discipline reaches some maturity, or when hegemonic perspectives are challenged, necessitating the telling of histories of origin, descent, debates and traditions, for challengers and carriers of hegemonic representation alike. Thus, whereas reference to 1648 (or Westphalia) is likely in any comprehensive IR-text dealing with a somewhat general theme, references to the

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51 Ibid., p. 61.
53 The most obvious exception to this rule lies in the widespread discussion of “traditions” of thought, e.g. establishing a 2500-year genealogy for Realism. In the same way as “debates”, “traditions” have typically been a vehicle for establishing intellectual legitimacy, and the practice is open to many of the same criticisms. See e.g. Jeffery 2005, Vigneswaran & Quirk 2010.
founding of the discipline and its first decades can usually only be found when for some reason or other the history of the discipline is discussed.⁵⁴

2.1 ‘1919 and all that’: The First Great Debate

The myth of 1919 consists of two interrelated elements: 1) that the discipline was born out of the calamities of WW1, and established as an Idealist attempt to solve the problem of war; 2) that interwar Idealism lost out to Realism in a First Great Debate, due to Idealism’s failure in both preventing and understanding/explaining the increasing interstate violence of the 1930’s and WW2. The myth is a fully externalist account of the origins and early development of the discipline, based on a Whiggish attitude that posits the notion of continuous progress towards a better understanding of the real world.

As alluded to above, the myth of 1919 was only codified relatively recently; Peter Wilson seems to have gotten it right when he noted how little historiographical consciousness there was in the discipline until the publication of The Aberystwyth Papers in 1972.⁵⁵ References to the dichotomy between realism and utopianism/idealism were explicit in the works of Carr, Fox, Wolfers and Herz,⁵⁶ but to contemporaries, writers like Carr, Herz, Morgenthau and Thompson were themselves seen as the relevant founders of the discipline, the war in and of itself vindicating a Realist approach to world politics. As Jack Donnelly notes,⁵⁷ as late as in the early 1980’s, the standard overview only started with the Realists of the post-war generation, in effect creating an abbreviated foundational myth. The key figure of this foundational myth – Realism triumphant – would nevertheless fit seamlessly into the myth of 1919, when the earlier history of the discipline was re-written. Thus, in the 1950’s and 60’s, only the final part of the myth of 1919 was active (making it more like a myth of 1945); Realism was the dominant theoretical approach in International Relations by virtue of best explaining international relations, by being the most realistic as it were.

⁵⁴ Apart from the straight historiographical texts and instances of innovation or retrenchment, these are typically instances of teaching. We cover textbooks below, but we will argue from personal experience and anecdotal evidence that the myth of 1919 is more commonly transmitted through the classroom than through the textbook, cf. Schmidt 1998 <ISQ: 438>.
Around 1970, historiographical interest was piqued for the first time. This was partly a result of the 50th anniversary of the founding of the first IR-chair at Aberystwyth, partly an aftermath of the methodological differences of the 1960’s (later codified as the second great debate) and partly a result of the inspiration from Kuhn and the idea of scientific paradigms. The immediate result was to extend the history of the discipline further backwards to 1919, and to incorporate a misguided generation of idealists that had been swept away by the tide of realism. This early historiography was thus largely an exercise in reaffirming the dominance of realism, presenting its victory in more exotic philosophy of science-terms.

From the early 1980s, the discipline (and its dominant Realist strand) was facing increasing internal criticism, and a number of critics framed their grievances in the terms of great debates. By presenting the on-going discord as the next in a line of “great debates”, one could both normalise dissent, by presenting deep-rooted debates as a normal phenomenon in the discipline, and claim parity with Realism, on the assumption that there can be no great debate if the sides are utterly unequal. The strategy was even self-consciously discussed: “Ever since the first ‘great debate’ between realism and idealism, there have been numerous attempts to reconstruct the history of ideas about international relations according to different conceptual schemes”, or, from a constructivist point of view, as late as 1998: “He [Carr] said they were locked in a debate, known thereafter as the great debate. Scholars ever since have sought to identify something that would constitute another debate to follow in the footsteps of E.H. Carr”. So, in a sense, the final codification of the myth of 1919 and the First Great Debate was a result of a number of disparate claims of status in the third (or fourth) Great Debate. It is nevertheless striking, and telling, how little agreement these

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58 Aber papers op. cit.
60 Lijphart!
61 The term “paradigm” has shown a remarkable resilience in IR-parlance, particularly in US textbooks. For an extended critique of the applicability of the term to IR; see Jackson & Nexon 2010.
64 Wæver
writers exhibit as to the number and quality of previous debates. In a sense, the re-writing of
disciplinary history that codified the myth of 1919, was only taking place as critical attention
was being directed towards that very myth. Thus we get one of the more succinct
presentations of the myth of 1919 presented by Donnelly in 1995. Although he acknowledges
that something was going on before WW1, he completely ignores the content of that
something, and notes the idea of the discipline being born as a by-product of the Versailles
Conference as merely a slight exaggeration. He also notes how the liberal internationalists (a
term he prefers to idealists) were more or less written out of the discipline by the post-war
realists, and goes on: “This first wave of realist writing initiated what is often called the ‘first
great debate’ in international relations – although in fact is <sic> was largely a one-sided
realist attack on ‘idealism’”. And finally, the realist message won through because it was
“better than the old one [and also] better fit the times”. So, even in a historically informed
narrative, the discipline is seen as for all intents and purposes emerging from the carnage of
WW1, with Idealists/Liberals dominating the discipline for most of the next two decades,
trying to think up ways of avoiding war, before being replaced by a Realists onslaught led by
E.H. Carr, offering a message more attuned to the realities of international life.

2.2 Deconstructing 1919

Just as the myth of 1919 was being expanded and refined, it was being challenged at its very
core; the relationship between E.H. Carr and the Utopians/Idealists/Liberals that he
challenged. Just as the myth of 1919 had been expanded gradually backwards from 1945 to
1919, the new generation of historiographically inclined writers started at the end; challenging
the alleged victory of Carr and fellow realists over the so-called idealists. The first stabs were
directed at Carr’s realism, with a number of writers suggesting that he was perhaps less of a
realist than previously believed, or that he was not even a realist.

And while Carr was put under closer scrutiny, the ones who were supposed to be his
opponents were also re-considered. Partly this was a result of the increased historical

65 See e.g. Roger Coate & Craig Murphy “A Critical Science of Global Relations, International
66 Donnelly, op. cit. 181.
67 Ibid: 182.
68 Cox, Booth, Linklater, Howe
awareness in the discipline, but the end of the cold war also led to renewed interest in the theories that had been developed before the cold war set in; a boost for liberal theorising after 1989 led to revived interest in liberal theorising before 1939.\textsuperscript{69} The immediate result was a wide-ranging reconsideration of the “Idealists”, revealing a breadth and diversity of thought that had been completely glossed over by the myth of 1919.\textsuperscript{70} From the British side, the multi-faceted character of what was dubbed the “New Liberal Internationalism” was stressed, while in the US, “Idealism” was demonstrated to be rooted in pluralist political science. Increasingly, writers dropped the terms Utopian/Idealist, and started applying the label “Liberal” (or some variety of it) to the writers of the interwar period.

And if the writers that Carr had denounced as Utopians turned out to be less so than he had claimed, the logical follow-up was to question Carr’s own credentials. To the earlier remarks were soon added a large number of comments, challenging the perception of Carr from internalist, externalist and contextualist perspectives, stressing the polemical, political and dialectic character of \textit{The Twenty Years’ Crisis} and its debts to a Mannheimian reflexivist sociology of science.\textsuperscript{71} Whereas no consensus has been reached on how best to characterise Carr, the large majority of those who have dealt with his work in any systematic fashion seems to agree that the label ‘realist’ fitted rather awkwardly in the case of Carr.\textsuperscript{72}

Possibly, then, it could be claimed that the Idealists were not Idealists and that Carr was not a realist. This obviously challenged the very idea of a first great debate among these two protagonists, and as part of the general onslaught it was soon argued that the whole idea of such a debate was merely a myth.\textsuperscript{73} While Carr’s book certainly created reaction, there was no wide-ranging debate, and no feeling that any “Idealist” position had been demolished.\textsuperscript{74}

Likewise, covering the inter-war period more generally, one can obviously find debates, but

\textsuperscript{69} This is implicit in much of the literature, but also explicit in a number of texts.

\textsuperscript{71} <Jones, Cox, Wilson, Kubalkova, etc.> As Michael Cox would glibly comment, these writers were almost single-handedly saving the British Car(r)-industry.

\textsuperscript{72} From Carr, the attention has later moved on to Morgenthau (and to a lesser extent Herz), with comprehensive re-valuations of their work and the intellectual tradition they stood in as well. <Some refs>

\textsuperscript{73} Peter Wilson, ‘The Myth of the First Great Debate’, \textit{Review of International Studies} 24 no. 4 (1998), 1-15; Osiander 1998; Bell 2003 (RIS)

\textsuperscript{74} Wilson in Cox.
nothing resembling a great debate between Liberals and Realists. There were rather debates between different approaches to politics in general, some of which would feed into post-WW2 realism as well. The process of defining Realism triumphant against Idealism in the immediate after-war years was political, seeking the application of a specific foreign policy and the insulation of the field of international politics from behaviouralist political science, rather than a debate against “Idealism”. It relied on forgetting a lot of the non-Realist research that was going on.

While there has been a lot of attention paid to the tail end of the myth of 1919, there has been less explicit focus on what happened before 1919. With increased historiographical attention, even that part of the myth has been challenged. If one focuses on the wider field, instead of the specific discipline of International Relations, writers have argued that can be found many important antecedents, starting in the last years of the 19th century. Important intellectual and policy-debates were waged regarding imperialism, geopolitics and trade, fostered in part by the perception of sweeping changes in world politics and economics, in part by the general development of the social sciences. Many of these debates were couched in the more general debate about the character of the state, with a German-inspired organic view opposing a more Anglo-American liberal position, and there was partial institutionalisation of a field in American political science and the APSA from 1904.

To sum up, the previous two decades have given us a rich historiographic literature on the origins of International Relations, even including debates on how to best to conduct historiographical research. Somewhat in parallel, there has also been a number of works applying insights from sociology of science to the historical development of International Relations.

Relations. The current status of knowledge is in stark contradiction to the myth of 1919. First, the discipline did not emerge out of nowhere in 1919, as a direct response to the First World War. The Great War did help to make a wide variety of liberal theories key to the first academic institutions, as the organic theories of state were seen as part of the problem that had led to the war, but there were a number of important theories being presented and debates happening before 1914. Second, there was never any group of people in the interwar years that described themselves as Idealists, and most of the people who have been described as such did not hold the views attributed to them. Rather, a plethora of views can be found, and if any umbrella-term must be applied, Liberal or Pluralist seems to be the most suitable ones. Third, E.H. Carr was hardly a Realist at all, but rather a dialectical thinker who (like most Liberals) believed that reasoned progress was possible in international relations, and who wrote his book establishing the dichotomy between Realist and Utopian thinking as a political and polemical intervention. Fourth, there was no great debate between Realists and any opponents. *The Twenty Year’s Crisis* did occasion a response, and there were certainly debates in the discipline in the interwar years, but no major showdown. There was some debate along the lines of Realism vs. Idealism in the United States in the early 1950s, but more concerned with foreign policy than International Relations theory. Finally, the triumph of Realism, while not unrelated to the experience of WW2, was also closely connected to specific disciplinary moves, attempting to insulate the study of international politics from liberal political science. It should be noted that to date, no-one has tried to repudiate these insights, not even the writers that invoked the First Great Debate in the 1980s and 1990s; there has been no attempt to debunk the debunkers.

Before we move on, one further comment should be made. A brief look at the references to the two previous sections should make clear the extent to which the historiographical developments and debates have been a European (and largely British) phenomenon. Even though writers from a number of countries have been active, the outlets for research have largely been journals published in Britain. When assessing the impact of the debunking in the next section, this sociological fact is hardly irrelevant.

### 2.3 Reconstructing 1919

81 The key text here is Wæver 1998.
Turning now to current textbooks, most of them do include an overview of different theories of IR, but a large number focus solely on the theories that are currently in vogue, with historical references stretching no further back than the 1980’s. Others writers have chosen to present the theories through an, often implicit, notion of traditions rather than debates, with each theoretical tradition presented as a paradigm. In such narratives, the chapter on liberalism might jump from Kant to Doyle, Keohane and others, while the chapter on realism skips from Hobbes to Carr or Morgenthau.

The most obvious change in tenor over the last two decades has been the move away from applying the term “idealism” and instead using “liberal” as the moniker for the theories of the interwar years. The move is by no means all-encompassing, but a growing number of writers seem to agree that the latter term is more appropriate than the former. One could be tempted to read this development as testament to the influence of historiography, but it seems much more likely that it has been related to the concurrent attempts at cementing liberalism as a solid, permanent and viable competitor to realism. The term Liberalism has gained ground not due to its greater historical veracity, but due to the construction of a more comprehensive Liberal genealogy. Nevertheless, one does find comments on how Idealism was a term that Realists constructed to discredit their opponents, and an unfair one at that, even though it was possibly applicable to “some of the more utopian idealists of the interwar period”. Others have noted the changing nomenclature, without pushing it through to its conclusion:

The body of theory known typically today as liberalism went by the term idealism for most of the twentieth century […] After World War I demonstrated the horror that humans could wreak on each other, idealists sought to create institutions that would mitigate violence and greed. […] World War II, and especially the Holocaust, as well as the collapse of the League of Nations, effectively undermined idealist theory

From this perspective, Liberalism is not a retroactively relevant term, the interwar writers were Idealists pure and simple. The mention of the Holocaust as a reason for the demise of

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82 Ikenberry online
83 “Modern realist theory developed in reaction to a liberal tradition that realists called idealism”, Joshua S. Goldstein & Jon C. Pevehouse *International Relations. 9th ed* New York: Longman. <YEAR>, p. 44.
Idealist theorising is relatively unique, while the relation between the world wars and theoretical change is still commonplace; after idealism collapsed, Morgenthau codified realism.\(^\text{86}\)

The disciplinary origins in 1919 and the transformation in 1945 are still taken more or less for granted: “International Relations was born out of the human tragedy of war”, \(^\text{87}\) and “Realism […] developed after World War II as a response to the failure of the interwar period’s (1919-1939) idealism”. \(^\text{88}\) A more elaborate narrative deserves to be quoted a bit more extensively:

In the twentieth century the idealist paradigm was most closely associated with Woodrow Wilson and the other thinkers who were prominent in the interwar period […] It was out of the ashes of World War I that idealists claimed to have learned certain lessons about the dynamics of international relations and what was needed to prevent another major war. […] Idealism’s reign as the dominant paradigm ended with its failure to anticipate and prevent World War II […] It was the idealists’ failure to comprehend the forces leading to World War II that gave rise to realism as the dominant paradigm in the immediate postwar period after 1945. \(^\text{89}\)

Idealism thus equals Wilson, it makes sense to discuss it as a paradigm, and it was eclipsed by Realism due to intellectual and political failure. It seems hard to be less attuned to the last two decades of historiographical research. In yet a different account, seeing Realism as the baseline of all IR scholarship, Idealism becomes merely a bump in the road: “In the period between World War I and World War II, the major challenger to the realist perspective was idealism”. \(^\text{90}\) Thus we have to conclude that the notion of something called Idealism still persists, even if less self-evidently than before, and that the wholly exogenous story of the emergence of the discipline and Idealism in 1919 (as an answer to WWI) and the victory of Realism in 1945 (after the carnage of WWII) are still largely uncontested.


\(^{89}\) J. Martin Rochester *Fundamental Principles of International Relations*. Boulder, CO: Westview. 2010, p.19.21. A somewhat more historically sensitive way of making the same point can be found in

Thus, it comes as no surprise that the idea of a first great debate is still nurtured as well:

There have been three major debates since IR became an academic subject at the end of the First World War and we are now in the early stages of a fourth. The first major debate is between utopian liberalism and realism […] The first major debate was clearly won by Carr, Morgenthau, and the other realist thinkers.  

While avoiding the term Idealist, this narrative sticks to the counting of debates, sees Carr as an unproblematic Realist, and the Realists as winners of a debate that it has been forcefully argued never took place. Placing the debate a little later, Viotti and Kauppi, while giving a valuable and balanced introduction to the work of Herz, still argue that Herz and Morgenthau “found themselves in the center of a great realist-idealist academic debate”. 

And even among scholars who are attuned to the historiographical literature, we find references to the first debate. Even though they note the problems inherent in discussing debates, Kurki and Wight nevertheless are satisfied that “Some of the debates, however, were genuine […] The first debate refers to the exchanges between the realists and idealists before, during and immediately after the Second World War”. 

Surely there is a cruel irony in choosing exchanges between realists and idealists as an example of a genuine debate in the field.

That it is nevertheless not impossible to write textbooks with a more principled approach to historiography, is demonstrated by Richard Devetak when he notes that “the very idea of narrating the discipline’s history as a series of ‘great debates’ is questionable”, but adds that “Even so, it is important for students to learn how the discipline has told stories about itself, which is why I persist with the narrative”. Indeed, a reflexive approach seems to us to be the

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only viable one – recalling the disciplinary grand narratives, while at the same time deconstructing them.

Casting our net wider yields only marginally better results. Words like “so-called” and “alleged” are often thrown out by writers who acknowledge the critical literature, but more often than not, the narrative persists unhampered. Outside of textbooks, references to the history of the subject can most often be found in works surveying the field of IR or some part of it. A particularly pertinent example can be found in the very special issue of Review of International Studies where Wilson debunked the myth of the first great debate, when Michael Nicholson, in the process of revisiting realism and utopianism, comments that

Idealism, often used in International Relations literature as a synonym for utopianism, was one of the parties to the ‘first great debate’ in International Relations (if a debate of which only a few thousand people were aware can properly be retted to as ‘great’: our profession does not suffer from modesty). 95

It does not suffer from accuracy either, it seems; Nicholson would have been more precise if acknowledging that no-one were aware of the debate at the time that it allegedly took place. Nicholson is nevertheless not alone. The authors of Security studies today e.g. note that “According to the usual chronology, the first great debate occurred between the utopians, who dominated the profession after the Great War, and the realists, who became dominant in the late 1930’s”. 96 It is not clear why the debate is drawn back into the 1930s, and the authors seem not to be in full consistence with themselves on either dating or terms. A little later they complain that “In the IR debate, the terms ‘neo-liberal’ and ‘realist’ are misleading. This is not a replay of the first great debate in international relations theory between idealism (or utopianism) and realism in the 1930s and 1940s”. 97 Yet others date the debate even earlier, commenting on “the sterile standoff of the first ‘great debate’ in IR – the intellectual struggle between so-called realists and idealists in the 1920s and 1930s over the nature of international

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97 Ibid. p. 48
politics”.\(^\text{98}\) What really makes this quote astonishing is the accompanying note referring to the work of the revisionist historiographers, calling it “illuminating”. Apparently not illuminating enough to make the author drop the idealist label, miss the reference to a debate that did not take place or even place the debate at the time when the original myth had it. If anything, this quote is even more misleading than the original myth of 1919.

Acknowledging that some of the debate-language is misleading is furthermore not enough, as is obvious when this observation is followed by “Of the debates that \textit{did} occur in IR, the first ‘great debate’ ruled questions of ethics out of order, establishing the primacy of realists over so-called idealists”.\(^\text{99}\) Likewise, in a critically acclaimed book, Colin Wight references Schmidt on the issue of debates, is still able to argue that

The development of IR theory, for example, is often understood in terms of three so-called great debates. [...]In the first great debate – between realists and idealists – Carr claimed that the difference between realism and idealism was similar to that between alchemy and chemistry.\(^\text{100}\)

Even in a volume like \textit{International relations in Europe: traditions, perspectives and destinations}, which includes articles by two of the academics that have made a mark on the historiography of the discipline (Brian Schmidt and Gerard Holden), and has editors that are historically aware, one can find casual references, from otherwise very historically attuned writers, to how “Masaryk who would be safely on the liberal side in the first great debate”,\(^\text{101}\) and how the international society perspective in Britain “has for a long time served as a clear and potentially radical challenge to realism and neo-realism as well as to the realist-idealist dualism associated with the ‘first great debate’ in IR”.\(^\text{102}\)

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\(^\text{98}\) Patrick Hayden \textit{The Ashgate Research Companion to Ethics and International Relations}. Farnham: Ashgate. 2009, p.1.


\(^\text{100}\) Colin Wight \textit{Agents, structures and international relations: politics as ontology}. Cambridge: CUP. 2006.


Others simply ignore the revisionist historiography completely, as Peu Gosh in an introductory text aimed at the Indian market:

When the Second World War (1939-1945) finally broke out, the idealists were blamed for their utopian thinking and their legalistic-moralistic assumptions were alleged to be far from the realities of power politics. IR soon came to be occupied with a critique of liberal idealism and out of this emerged a new paradigm – Realism, sometimes also known as Realpolitik – an anti-thesis to Idealism. […] This was the emergence of the first ‘Great Debate’ in IR in the post-World War II period.¹⁰³

With its externalist approach, its lumping of idealists its stark dichotomising and the reference to a great debate in IR after WWII, this text could just as well have been written 20 years ago. The same could be said about the worst that we have saved for last. G. John Ikenberry starts his summary of the growth of American IR by noting and endorsing the following story:

The most frequently invoked narrative of the rise of American IR suggests that it has been marked by a series of ‘great debates’. The first occurred in the late 1930s between ‘realist’ and ‘idealist’ positions – fighting over the dreams and failures of the world that followed the World War I. […] These ‘great debates’ do capture the unfolding intellectual story of the American discipline of IR.¹⁰⁴

Yet again we are presented the author’s own twist on the wider mythology of the development of IR, where the first great debate is not a result of the failures of idealism, but rather an interwar struggle about how best to represent the world. Ikenberry pursues his line further, introducing the debaters as well:

The first ‘great debate’ was triggered by the World War I and its aftermath. And this debate was given voice in the ideas of the first great realist of this era – the British historian, E.H. Carr and the first great liberal visionary of this era – President


Woodrow Wilson. The upheaval of the World War I was really the historical event that put the professional study of IR on its path.\textsuperscript{105}  

Never mind that Carr is hardly considered a realist anymore, that there was no debate and that the discipline had roots well before 1919. But Ikenberry still has one ace up his sleeve, even though there had been things going on before WW2, “In many ways, it was Hans Morgenthau’s *Power among Nations* <sic> that signalled the coming professionalization of the field”.\textsuperscript{106}

There are obviously also examples of writers taking the insights of the revisionist historiography to heart, but overall it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the impact has been marginal. Even those who acknowledge that a revision has been going on, and add the occasional “alleged” and “so-called”, are prone to nevertheless reproduce the original bunk. The one area where some progress has been made has been in the reassessment and rebranding of the motley crew previously known as utopians or idealists. In conjunction with the on-going construction of a Liberal body of theory to rival Realism, interwar liberals have gotten a new name, and more attention has been paid to them. Since many of the revisionist historiographers explicitly wanted to make this interwar theorising relevant to the current age, a modicum of success must be granted. But as we discuss in the next section, when this rehabilitation is not coupled with more general historiographical insight, it comes at a cost.

3. The Stubbornness of the Myths and the Noble Discipline of IR

As we have argued, the Peace of Westphalia cannot be construed as the beginning of a new order. Even if the discipline of IR sees it as marking the establishment and the formalization of the system of sovereign states, there is little evidence to support such a claim. The causes of the Thirty Years’ War, the motives of the various political actors, the political situation before and after the war as well as the treaties themselves tell an altogether different story.

The Peace of Westphalia therefore cannot be said to represent the end of the hegemonic ambitions of the Emperor and the victory of state sovereignty nor was the Thirty Years’ War

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., p. 207.  
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., p. 209.
fought because of the threat posed by Habsburg expansionism. That battle was already effectively won before 1618. But if this is true, then the modern field of IR has been developed on the basis of a false prospectus concerning the interpretation of the war.

As we have pointed out, the Westphalian account of state formation is largely mythical, finding little or no support in either the Treaties of Westphalia themselves or the political events surrounding the Thirty Years’ War. Firstly, 1648 did not mark the emergence of the modern state and the states system – while some polities can be said to have developed into modern states by 1648, others cannot. Nor did 1648 mark the end of the universal aspirations of Pope or (Habsburg) Emperor. Emperors had been weak long before the Thirty Years’ War, and if any state had hegemonic aspirations in the 1620s, it must surely have been France rather than the Holy Roman Empire, which at the time was mostly concerned with the internal confessional distribution of power. Finally, the Westphalian settlement did not represent the foundation of a new order based upon state sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty had emerged more than a century before, and, far from being a consensual principle agreed upon at the treaty negotiation table, was the result of a long legitimacy contest between ‘national’ rulers and the Pope, and had already been in play in relations between states during the sixteenth century.

As we have suggested, IR theorists today ought to adopt a less rigid ontology which takes into account the vast diversity of polities which coexisted and interacted long after 1648 – be they empires, states, city states or leagues – and a more dynamic understanding of political change which allows for long and nonlinear processes. But the myth lives on in the most recent editions of IR textbooks.

A possible explanation for why the myth still lives on in IR, in spite of the repeated attempts to debunk it, is that the Westphalian myth has served, and still serves, an heuristic function in IR, conveniently providing the discipline with a founding myth – a simple and tidy story about the origin of the states system. As Osiander has argued,

Conveniently and comprehensively, it explains the origin of what are considered the main characteristics of that system, such as territoriality, sovereignty, equality, and nonintervention. It fits perfectly with the accepted view of what international relations
is about, or at least has ‘traditionally’ been about: relations of a specific kind […] among actors of a specific kind.\textsuperscript{107}

In short, while referring to what for most IR scholars is a date in the distant past, the Westphalia myth seems to offer a history of the international system, but actually has the effect of stifling any kind of historical sensibility or inquiry, whether pre- or post-1648, by marking the boundary of an endless and synchronic present. Once this becomes apparent it is hard any longer to avoid the question of whether IR today needs such a founding myth, or whether such a myth can be detrimental to the discipline. It may be this implication that has ensured that revisionists are seen but not heard.

For the Westphalian fixation of IR has rendered the discipline largely blind to historical change, and in spite of recent attempts to displace it, 1648 still figures centrally in the IR literature as the point of origin of the modern state, a novel concept of sovereignty, and the European state-system. Understanding historical processes and change in IR requires that we transgress the Westphalian boundary. As demonstrated above, there is good reason to do away with the myth of Westphalia altogether. And, while past scholars ought to be forgiven for their Westphalian sins, a discipline such as IR – in which debates about origins figure more centrally than in most other social sciences – should by now start to train a new generation of scholars who will not sanctify 1648.

One of the main functions of the Westphalian take in IR has been to emphasize states at the expense of other political units – mainly empires – avoiding with that too many inquiries into European states’ imperial practices beyond Europe. Through the myth of 1648, the discipline of IR is constructed as a noble discipline; one which wishes to find the way to peaceful development in spite of its violent ontology of war. This imperial omission of the myth of 1648 is also one of the functions of the myth of 1919.

It is conventionally thought that IR was born in 1919 and that this dates performs a vital function in the self-image of the discipline. 1919 is significant because it comes on the back of a painful 48-month gestation period – notably the carnage of the First World War. It is this which enables the IR imagination to focus on the rise of inter-war idealism, blessed as it was

with the noble purpose of finding ways to solve the universal problem of war (even if Carr later turned round and painted this search as but a quest for the holy grail). It is striking that scholars hold onto 1919 as the birth-year of their discipline, despite the vital interventions of Schmidt and Vitalis.\(^{108}\) Here we suggest that when the birth-year becomes stuck or frozen in this way, despite repeated attempts to unstuck or thaw it, then this points to the possibility that there is an identity-based function that lurks beneath the ‘sovereignty of 1919’. And this, we would suggest, lies in the point that 1919 provides the IR community with a heart-warming rendition of the basis or function of their discipline: to find ways to solve the universal problem of war. This simultaneously offers up an autonomous intellectual rationale for a discipline that not infrequently exhibits a sense of insecurity regarding its status as a discipline (compared to the older ones such as sociology and history). Thus much as economics is concerned to understand the causes of economic development or the wealth (and poverty) of nations, and that sociology is concerned to understand the origins and processes of society, so IR is concerned to understand the relations between sovereign states and to enquire how these might best be managed for the security of the world’s peoples. That the inter-war idealists were indeed concerned to solve the universal problem of war is a reasonable proposition. But to a not inconsiderable extent they were also interested in solving provincial problem of a declining Western hegemony over the East on the one hand, and a potential future race war between East and West on the other.

Most specifically, the noble myth of the birth of IR that Carr bequeaths the discipline obscures the dark side of the story: that inter-war idealism emerged in the context not simply of WWI but also in the milieu of the colonial racial revolt against Western imperialism. Critically the year 1919 marked the launch of the enterprise known as the \textit{empire strikes back}. It is true that this Eastern challenge had emerged in the Western imagination after 1889,\(^ {109}\) but it was in 1919 that it crystallised in the minds of the Europeans as a phantasmagorical-like dark nemesis of white/Western supremacy. Thus far from expressing a highly optimistic vision of a coming peace, inter-war idealism exhibited or reflected a deep sense of anxiety in the Western imagination as the fault-lines of the West’s imperial hegemony appeared to be cracking. In essence, we argue that far from fatally ‘ignoring power’, inter-war idealists


sought to maintain an imperialist hierarchy of racial and/or civilizational power of the West over the East. And far from invoking a universalist liberal-based cultural pluralism that was founded on a tolerance of the other, the key inter-war idealists operationalised two imperialist metanarratives – what can be called paternalist-imperialist Eurocentrism on the one hand (as in Alfred Zimmer, Norman Angell, and David Mitrany) and an imperialist racism on the other (as in Woodrow Wilson and Raymond Buell).

Woodrow Wilson is, of course, thought of as one of the discipline’s founding icons, simultaneously doubling up as possibly the key founding father of 20th century liberal internationalism. That standard discussions of Wilson focus almost solely on his Fourteen Point Speech’, which is of course a dot-point discussion rather than an academic piece of sustained prose, is telling. For while this gives rise in the popular IR imagination to the ‘essence’ of Wilson – self-determination and anti-imperialism – it obscures the central message of his intellectual or academic writings. For these reveal the point that for Wilson self-determination was to be granted only to the (relatively) civilized Eastern Europeans and should be withheld from the non-white races. It was vital to maintain imperialism so that the inferior races could be brought to maturity through gaining the right sort of ‘character’ that was in turn the necessary pre-requisite for the awarding of self-determination.

The background to this idea was laid out in a series of articles and especially in his book *The State* (1918). There he recounts a scientific racist story of how the Teutons/Aryans were blessed with an exceptional propensity for constitutional government. In particular, his notion of ‘character’ was crucial to his theory of imperialism. For Wilson, character was synonymous with ‘self-control and self-discipline’; and he saw these as the vital pre-requisites for democracy and of legitimate self-determination. Echoing the imperialist theory of John Burgess, Wilson believed that while the Aryan/Teutonic races had demonstrated the highest levels of character, nevertheless with the proper tutelage non-European races could, albeit over a long period of time, be imbued with this quality. And it was this very idea that formed the foundation of his approach to imperialism.

While conventional IR historiography assumes that Wilson’s conception of self-determination was anti-imperialist, the logic of his writings suggest otherwise. In a 1902 article in the

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Atlantic Monthly, ‘The Ideals of America’, Wilson insisted that the colonization of the Philippines constituted a critical means by which the Filipinos could be uplifted into civilization. There he concludes that the Filipinos ‘must first take the discipline of law, must first love order and instinctively yield to it. We [the Americans] are old in this learning and must be their tutors’. Specifically, he argues that if the Americans can teach the Filipinos the noble ways of discipline and self-government – including justice and fairness in administration – so this ‘will infinitely shorten their painful tutelage… We must govern as those who are in tutelage. They are children and we are men’. In essence he argues that the Americans cannot ‘give the Philippines independence/self-government now. To do so would be to leave them like a rudderless boat adrift’. Above all, self-government cannot be simply ‘given’ but must be earned, graduated into from the hard school of life.

The key idea – that of ‘graduating’ into self-government through imperial tutelage – means that self-determination for the colonized peoples would have to be postponed. This reflects his argument that constitutional political development is something that occurs over a very long period of time, as he argued in the case of Teutonic/Aryan constitutional state-formation in The State, as much as it reflected his Lamarckian brand of racism, in which race progress can be achieved but only by definition very gradually. And it was precisely this gradualist idea that underpinned his advocacy of the League of Nations Mandates System. Echoing the language of Wilson’s paternalist racism, the famous Article 22 of the League Covenant asserted that ‘[t]o those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant’. Moreover, the ‘tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who… can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.’


logical outcome of Wilson’s racist politics, rather than a concession to the imperialist dictates that were pressed upon him by various delegates at Versailles.

Most of the well-known inter-war idealists subscribed to a different, albeit highly complementary narrative – what can be called paternalist Eurocentric institutionalism. It helps to note that such a discourse differs to the racism of Wilson and others on the grounds that cultural and institutional factors constitute the principle line of cleavage or difference between East and West. Here genetic factors play no role whatsoever. Nevertheless, despite this important distinction, the arguments concerning imperialism remain strikingly similar.

David Mitrany, Norman Angell, Alfred Zimmern, as well as Leonard Woolf, all argued that the civilizing mission must be continued under the supervision of the Mandates System, given that such oversight would, in theory, ensure that the national colonial powers treat the colonies in an empathic and fair way. However, there is one key distinction that needs to be noted. For while Mitrany and Woolf both insisted on the centrality of the Mandates System,113 Angell and Zimmern argued that the League was a necessary but not sufficient factor in preventing a future race war and that what was needed, above all else, was the rehabilitation of the British Empire.114

Taking Zimmern as the example here, he argues that since WWI the emergence of the League led to the lamentable appropriation of many of the functions of what he calls the Second British Empire. This concern prompted him to ask rhetorically: ‘[r]obbed of its special tasks of yesterday, our British genius needs new worlds to conquer. Our energy, our experience, our public spirit, our immense goodwill – how are we to employ them?115 And he replies that ‘the great task that lies before us in this generation [is that] of ensuring the peace of the world116 This is more necessary than ever given the Eastern threat to world order that emerged especially after 1918, which in turn led him to proclaim that ‘[t]he race question, stirring as it does some of the most elemental of human passions, is the most urgent problem of our time… It cannot be evaded… It must be faced in all its unpleasantness – or the consequences of

115 Zimmern, Third British Empire, p. 107.
neglecting it will be a thousand times more unpleasant”\textsuperscript{117} The solution lay with the creation of what he calls the \textit{Third British Empire}; something which takes the form of a Commonwealth of Nations where its members enjoy considerable autonomy. Nevertheless, this idea was to apply only to the white dominions, such that non-white colonies were to be retained in a formal dependent relationship. Either way, though, the restoration of the legitimacy of the British Empire was vital for world order because the League could not act as the guarantor of world peace, though equally the Empire required the League. The British Empire, he argued, ‘must survive as a league within the larger League… Only in and through the League can the [Empire] solve its problems of to-day and take up the tasks reserved for it to-morrow’\textsuperscript{118} Because the Empire is founded on law and liberty this enables it ‘to set an effective standard for mankind’.\textsuperscript{119} Above all, he asserts:

The work that the British Empire is called upon to do is to preserve the peace of the world. [It] is the surest bulwark against war in the present-day world – for this generation, at any rate, a surer bulwark than the League of Nations itself. If this Association were destroyed, if the communities that compose the British [imperial] Commonwealth separated in anger or broke up into two or more opposing camps, the outbreak of a new and more terrible world-war would only be a question of years. No League could prevent it… If the League can keep the peace to-day, it is because the British Empire provides the chief of its guardians and executants.\textsuperscript{120} All in all, then, restoring the imperial hegemony of the West over the East, either through the Mandates System in general or through the British Empire in particular, was a key objective of all the key inter-war idealists. Resuscitating this dark side of the discipline’s birth that currently lies deeply sublimated within the deep recesses of the IR imagination is vital, not just to complete our narrative but also to alert our readership to the need to question the very noble identity of the discipline that has been cherished for too long. Equally so, rather than deferring the full emergence of sovereignty to another date that 1648, we would do better to investigate political change as a gradual process which allows for a more diverse ontology than the fixation on the state which has been characteristic of the discipline of International Relations.

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid, p. 109.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid, p. 75.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., p. 87.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid, pp. 94–5